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How should public services be 
commissioned? 
BLOCK GRANT MODEL 
• Annually contracted 
• Pay a fixed sum to provider 
• Expect provide to manage 
demand 
• Usually based on adjustments 
to previous years activity 
• Often little in the contract 
covering quality or outcomes 
PAYMENT BY RESULTS (PbR) 
• Pay for Performance (P4P) 
• Identify the outcomes you 
want to be delivered 
• Define a payment model 
• Maximise incentives 
• Minimise perverse 
incentives 
Experiments in Social 
Policy in England in 
moving to PbR 
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Experiments in P4P models in England 
• Models are being used in the NHS, Criminal Justice, 
Troubled Families and in Welfare to Work 
• Many models and terms used, inc. Social Impact Bonds  
The Currency: 
The thing being purchased 
The Tariff 
The price set for 
each unit 
In theory: 
- Services paid for the 
results they achieve 
- A fixed price allows 
a focus on 
improving quality & 
outcomes 
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Practical challenges to P4P 
• Defining the thing being contracted for (the currency) 
• How wide should the scope be across a 
system/pathway? 
• How to define the outcomes?   
• And to be able to make attributions that the service has 
delivered the outcomes. 
• Should we specify care processes/pathways? 
• What period should contracts be for? 
• Defining a payment (tariff) model that provides the right 
incentives and rewards for risks, but also minimises 
perverse incentives. 
• Data collection, quality and analysis. 
• Balancing complexity/clarity/comprehensiveness/ 
practicality 
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PbR in Acute Physical Health Care in 
England 
Phased introduction from 2003/4 – slow and carefully 
managed nationally 
  
National tariff introduced - formula adapted almost every year 
to address specific challenges  
 
The payment is actually by episodes of care (activity) (results?) 
 
Trying to evolve to better tariffs for best practice and whole 
pathways 
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Some lessons from Acute PbR 
• Early implementers generally welcomed it 
• It was more complex & time consuming than anticipated 
• It exposed some weaknesses, e.g. financial instability 
• Coding and data were challenging  
• Coding  worsened in 2009/10 - new model introduced 
• Wide variation in coding error rates - between 0 and 28 per 
cent  
• Quality of costing information (to underpin the tariffs) is very 
variable 
• Increases in capacity, with reduced waiting times 
• Some evidence of increased efficiency, no sign of decreased 
quality in some areas of care 
• But, financial pressures on commissioners – no demand 
management 
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Developing PbR in Mental Health 
Care in England 
• the Currency was always seen as problematic for mental 
health – too many diagnostic codes and too much 
uncertainty. 
• model of Care Clusters  developed in North East England  
• A cluster is now the currency. 
 
• The whole country is now in a process of adopting the model 
for commissioning and managing adult mental health care. 
 
• Assessment and allocation to a cluster 
• Mental Health Clustering Tool (MHCT) (HoNOS with 
additional questions) – used for assessments 
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Mental Health Care Clusters 
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• All service users/patients allocated to an (initial) care 
cluster by the end of 2011 
• Providers have submitted 2010-11 reference costs to DH 
on a cluster  basis for the first time 
• Commissioners and providers agree local tariffs for 2012-
13, based on the cost of the care clusters 
• Locally refine PbR model in 2012-13, including refine care 
packages (to be in line with NICE guidance and standards) 
• Earliest possible date for a nation tariff was 2013-4 (didn’t 
happen) 
 
• Steady implementation, but emphasis on local not 
national 
Mental Health PbR Implementation 
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• There is encouragement that PbR should : 
• Define and reward results in terms of recovery 
• Should address inequalities within mental health care 
• Should address inequalities between people with 
mental health problems and the rest of the population 
(e.g. physical health) 
 
• This is ambitious 
• There is ongoing work to define such results for PbR 
• But no real testing of its impact on practice as yet 
• Can such improvements rest so much on payment 
systems? 
Mental Health PbR, recovery & 
inequalities 
11 
• Commissioners and providers reported they were not 
ready for local PbR 
• Adjusting – language, sensemaking and communication  
• Data quality for clustering 
• Defining and collecting data on results/recovery 
• Integrating it with social care – PbR is a health system 
• Defining care packages and pathways – balancing 
personalised care with standardised care 
• Developing consistency and addressing inequalities – is 
localism the answer? 
 
• But, services are looking more closely at what teams do. 
Challenges found so far 
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Conclusion 
• Writing of plans to extend PbR beyond acute care : 
 
‘It is best to decide how to pay for non-acute care by first 
stating what payment is designed to achieve and then 
evaluating the funding options. The English are making the 
decision back-to-front by deciding to extend PbR and then 
trying to make the service fit into this payment model.’ 
(Street & Maynard 2007) 
 
• PbR/P4P models will continue to be experimented with in 
social policy in England 
• Mental health has aspirations about recovery/results, but 
faces many challenges to make a system work  
• Implementation needs evaluating 
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